Abstract
Introduction
A Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) passively monitors network traffic on a link, looking for suspicious activity as defined by its protocol analyzers (see Figure 1) .
In order to correctly analyze a stream of traffic, the NIDS must first determine which packets reach the target host it is monitoring and then, for those that do, in- terpret them exactly as the target host does. The problem is therefore equivalent to NIDS being able to perform a complete and precise simulation of the network and the host machines; in this paper we restrict our discussion to the NIDS' ability to simulate the network and transport layers. The dominant obstacle to achieving this goal is ambiguity: the wide variety of network topologies and TCP/IP-stack policies makes it impossible for the NIDS to know the correct interpretation of traffic without additional context. The result is a divergence between how a host interprets a sequence of packets and how the NIDS believes the sequence has been interpreted. The NIDS can be tricked by an attacker into believing that no attack occurred or may be confused by a multitude of possible interpretations, some of which are attacks and some of which are not. The evasions are not just theoretically possible: Ptacek and Newsham [PN98] describe a number of specific methods for exploiting this sort of ambiguity at the TCP/IP layer. Furthermore, toolkits have been developed which automate their use [So02, Mc98] . Thus, it is of considerable practical concern that we find a way to resolve TCP/IP-based ambiguities.
In this paper we explore a novel approach to eliminating TCP/IP ambiguity, called Active Mapping. The key idea is to acquire sufficient knowledge about the intranet being monitored that, using it, the NIDS can tell which of those packets will arrive at their purported recipient, and, if so, how they will be interpreted. Active Mapping does this by building up a profile database of the key properties of the hosts being monitored and the topology that connects them. Profiles are constructed by sending specially crafted packets to each host and interpreting the responses to determine path properties and TCP/IP policies (see Section 3 and the Appendix for details).
Using Active Mapping profiles makes a NIDS context-sensitive.
Some measure of contextsensitivity-awareness of the hosts the monitor is trying to protect-is necessary; writing more detailed analyzers is of no use when we don't know how to disambiguate the traffic we are analyzing. No amount of careful coding in the NIDS can remove context-related ambiguity. Thus, something like our approachgathering host-and network-specific information and using it in the NIDS-is inevitable if we are to make inroads against the problem of ambiguity in a passive monitor. The information-gathering may be done in other ways, e.g., passively, but the principle remains the same.
Previous work proposes to eliminate ambiguity in NIDS analysis by using a traffic normalizer [HKP01] . The normalizer, which sits in the forwarding path before the NIDS, rewrites incoming traffic into well-formed streams that presumably admit only one interpretation on all reasonable TCP/IP implementations. Thus the NIDS, with a single policy set, can unambiguously analyze the traffic for intrusion attempts on any of the hosts of the protected network.
Though it succeeds in reducing ambiguity, a normalizer, like any active (traffic-altering) element, has a number of drawbacks. One is performance: the normalizer must be able to reconstruct every TCP stream in realtime. Another is robustness: since the normalizer is in the forwarding path of every packet, it must be extremely reliable even in the face of resource exhaustion; it also must be resistant to stateholding and CPU attacks on itself. Normalization also potentially changes the semantics of a stream. As detailed in [HKP01] , these changes can break some mechanisms, like traceroute and Path MTU discovery.
By contrast, a NIDS armed with a profile database can resolve ambiguities in a traffic stream it observes without having to intercept or modify the stream, which has major operational and semantic advantages. We stress that making contextual information available to the NIDS is the only way to do correct disambiguation of a stream without modifying it, so employing something like Active Mapping is essential.
Next, let us consider an example evasion. Figure 2 details an evasion based on uncertainty about the number of hops between the NIDS and a target host. If an attacker manipulates the TTL field of packets to confuse the NIDS, it can not know which of many possible packet sequences was actually received and accepted by the host. On the other hand, if the NIDS has information about the network path to the host, then it can eliminate the ambiguity. It is just this information that Active Mapping gathers and supplies to the NIDS. With it, the NIDS can ignore packets that will not reach the host, enabling correct analysis. It may be tempting to try to simultaneously analyze all possible interpretations of the packet stream; however, the space of possible network topologies and TCP/IP policies is so large as to make the problem intractable (see Figure 2 and the Appendix for examples).
We have implemented a prototype of Active Mapping and run it on a network of about 6,700 hosts. Our tests showed that the increased precision in analysis does not come with any significant performance cost at runtime for the NIDS. The increased memory cost was minimal as well. We present results to this effect in Section 5.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we discuss a model of operation of the mapper. In Section 3, we discuss the abilities and limitations of Active Mapping, examining selected tests in detail. The mapper's implementation is described in Section 4; the results of mapping real-world networks and NIDS integration tests are presented in Section 5 along with a discussion of performance and findings. We give an overview of related work in Section 6, including the potentially symbiotic relationship between Active Mapping and normalization, and conclude with a summary of our findings in Section 7. In the Appendix, we make an effort to cover the complete spectrum of TCP/IP mappings.
Design

Assumptions
In order to perform mapping efficiently, we make certain assumptions about the nature of the network being . The NIDS is 15 hops from the sender, but the receiver is 20 hops from the sender. Packets with an initial TTL greater than 15 but less than 20 will be seen by the NIDS but will be dropped before reaching the receiver. Since the retransmitted segments are inconsistent, the NIDS does not know the correct interpretation.
monitored:
Network topology is relatively stable. We discuss how often mapping may be performed (based on the prototype mapper's performance) in Sections 5.3 and 5.6.
The attacker is outside the network; if there is collusion with a user on the inside, there is little any system can do. Malicious insiders working alone are assumed to be unable to change or drop particular packets. This latter assumption is more likely to be true for switched networks.
There is a firewall that can be used for simple packet-level filtering, especially address-based ingress and egress filtering to prevent spoofing. Also, we assume the NIDS' tap is inside the firewall.
Hosts' TCP/IP stacks behave consistently within ordinary parameters: that is, if they exhibit unusual behavior, it will be at boundary cases. We do not, for example, run every TCP mapping test at every possible sequence number.
Design Goals
We have been guided by a number of design principles in constructing our system:
Comparable runtime performance. The use of Active Mapping profiles should not appreciably slow down the NIDS nor significantly increase its memory requirements.
Mapping should be lightweight. The bandwidth consumed by mapping packets should be small enough not to disrupt ordinary traffic on the network nor disrupt the operation of the host being mapped. The process of mapping should also be completed in a modest amount of wall-clock time.
Avoid harming the hosts. While no intentionally malicious packets are sent, bugs in a host's TCP/IP implementation might be triggered by the (unusual) mapping packets. Each test should be checked against known vulnerabilities before being deployed.
Architecture
Our overall strategy is as follows: independent of the NIDS, an Active Mapping machine scans each host on Host Profile Table   NIDS the internal network, building for each host a profile of the network path and TCP/IP stack properties. These profiles are stored in a database. At runtime, a NIDS can use the database to resolve potential ambiguities (see Figure 3 ). For example, the NIDS can use the host profiles to decide whether to accept or discard SYN data in TCP packets, depending on the policy of the host for which the packet is destined. We note that although our method allows many ambiguities to be resolved, sometimes the very presence of ambiguity may be indicative of noteworthy behavior (an attack attempt, for example). Thus a NIDS may want to retain the ability to notify the administrator of suspicious behavior, even when the interpretation of that behavior is clear. Our mapping tool is intended to be run on a machine whose network point is topologically equivalent to the link the NIDS is watching (see Figure 3 ). Typically this is between the firewall and any internal routers. It is important that the mapper be able to send packets on this link, since the mapping results should reflect the path of actual packets from the point of view of the NIDS. In order to keep the NIDS from interpreting mapping traffic as attacks on internal hosts, the NIDS should be configured to ignore traffic to and from the mapping machine.
The mapper begins mapping a host by performing service discovery and hop count and Path MTU (PMTU) determination. It initiates TCP connections to a set of TCP services and sends ICMP echo packets to determine which services are available. Subsequent testing is abstracted within the mapper to use those services. For example, some tests require determining whether some particular TCP data is accepted by the receiver. To do so, we can use any service for which we can tell by its response whether it received the specific data. To date, we have developed concrete implementations of SSH and HTTP beneath this abstraction. Other tests require simpler abstract interfaces. PMTU determination, for example, is done with ICMP echo if available, or any TCP service failing that. The hop count and PMTU of the path to each host are determined next (Section 3.2). Once these basic properties have been established, we conduct a variety of IP and TCP tests (Section 3.2), generating the host profiles. Each test is repeated multiple times to confirm the result and account for timeouts and late or duplicated packets. To reduce correlated failures, we never run more than one instance of a (host, test) pair at the same time.
Active Mapping: Details and Limitations
To thoroughly analyze the applicability of Active Mapping to resolving possible ambiguities, we follow the "header-walking" technique used in [HKP01] . We feel this is a good place to start, since the authors of that paper used a systematic approach to enumerate possible ambiguities in TCP/IP streams. We examine each ambiguity to see if it can be resolved via Active Mapping, or, if it is very simple, if it can be handled by stateless firewall rules (see Section 3.1). Thus, we provide a reasonably complete picture of the ability of Active Mapping to eliminate TCP/IP ambiguity. A summary of the Active Mapping approach to every normalization in [HKP01] is in the Appendix. To date, we have implemented a selected subset of these mappings, spanning a number of different types of ambiguities. We discuss them in detail in Section 3.2. Many of the mappings in the full list are straightforward additions given the types we have already implemented.
Active Mapping has some additional concerns beyond those for normalization (mostly regarding timing, since, e.g., normalized traffic is generally not subject to IP fragment timeouts). We discuss these and other cases that are not easily tackled using our approach in Section 3.3. A discussion of some practical concerns such as NATs and DHCP follows in Section 3.5.
Firewall Filters
Certain simple cases should be handled by stateless packet filtering at the firewall:
Verifying IP header checksums Ingress and egress filtering, i.e., accepting external and internal source addresses only on those respective interfaces Blocking packets to broadcast addresses or to reserved private address spaces Rejecting packets whose IP header length field is too small or too large
In short, the firewall should reject packets that could not be part of legitimate traffic or that are so malformed as to be useless to an endhost.
Selected Mappings
For a complete list of normalizations and the Active Mapping approach to each, please see the Appendix.
Hop Count. Knowing the number of hops to an end host allows us to resist the evasion in Figure 2 . The easiest way to determine hop count is to use the traceroute utility. However, its strategy of sending three packets per hop, increasing the search radius one hop at a time, is quite time-consuming. To speed this up, we instead use a known service on the system and send a packet to it that is expected to elicit a response. Most hosts will set the initial TTL value to ¾ AE or ¾ AE ½ for AE .
Thus from the response we can make a good first guess of the number of hops by subtracting the TTL in the response packet from the next highest value of ¾ AE · ½ . This guess could be wrong if the routing is asymmetric or the host happens to use a different initial value. Our search strategy is therefore to test the range to , then if that fails to yield a result, perform a binary search.
PMTU.
Knowing the Path MTU-the Maximum Transmission Unit over the path to the host-is important because packets greater than this size with the DF (Don't Fragment) bit set are discarded. To determine it, we send packets of various sizes to known services on the hosts with the DF bit set and watch for responses.
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As with hop count determination, we optimize for the common case. Since many internal networks run on Ethernet, which has an MTU size of 1500 bytes, we test this first, then do a binary search on [0, 1500], since the mapper's MTU will generally be limited by its local Ethernet interface to 1500.
TCP RST Acceptance. RFC 793 [Po81c] specifies that a TCP RST packet is to be accepted if and only if it is within the receiver's window. A non-compliant TCP could create problems for a NIDS, which would not know if the connection had been terminated or not. The algorithm we use is as follows.
Repeat the following steps with the offset Ç set equal to 0 (in sequence), 1 (in the window), and Ï+small constant (outside the window):
Send a TCP SYN packet at sequence number Ë.
Receive a SYN/ACK packet, including a window size Ï.
Send an ACK packet to establish the connection.
Send RST packet at Ë · Ç. Send FIN packet in sequence, i.e., at Ë.
Receive one of: ACK of FIN packet
RST not accepted; RST or nothing 2 RST accepted.
Overlapping and Inconsistent IP Fragments. RFC 791 [Po81a] states, "In the case that two or more fragments contain the same data either identically or through a partial overlap, this [suggested] procedure will use the more recently arrived copy in the data buffer and 1 In principle, we could also watch for ICMP Needs Fragmentation responses, some of which indicate the limiting MTU size at the router generating the response. But it is simpler for us to directly assess PMTU end-to-end. 2 Note that although a RST should be generated in response to the FIN if the initial RST was accepted, some hosts have firewalling software that will not respond to packets not sent to open connections (so as to leak as little information as possible). Thus we equate receiving no response (within 5 seconds) to an acceptance of the RST we sent. datagram delivered." It does not talk about inconsistent or overlapping fragments. Furthermore, employing the suggested policy has security implications: firewalls and other packet filters must reassemble packets before making any decisions about them, since at any point, a new fragment can overwrite data from an old one. It is therefore no surprise that there are many different implementations in use.
We perform fragment reassembly testing using ICMP echo packets; in principle the test could be performed with TCP packets as well. We send a sequence of fragments, each one containing a multiple-of-eight byte payload (since the IP offset field is in those units). The diagram below shows each of the six fragments, numbered by the order in which they were sent; their payloads consisted of that number replicated a multiple-of-eight number of times. For example, the third fragment was sent at an IP offset of 6 (corresponding to the 48th octet in the overall packet) and had a 24-byte payload of the repeating character '3'. Each fragment but the last had the MF (More Fragments) bit set. The fragments' offsets and the host's possible interpretations are given below, along with the names of the policies to which they correspond: The following is a description of the policies we have observed so far:
BSD. This policy left-trims an incoming fragment to existing fragments with a lower or equal offset, discarding it if it is overlapped entirely by existing fragments. All remaining octets are accepted; overlapping fragments with a greater offset are discarded or trimmed accordingly. This policy is documented more thoroughly in Wright and Stevens [WS95] , pp. 293-296.
BSD-right.
This policy is similar to BSD, except fragments are right-trimmed (new fragments take precedence over those with a lower or equal offset).
Linux. The Linux policy is almost the same as the BSD policy, except that incoming fragments are trimmed only to existing fragments with a strictly lower offset; that is, existing fragments with the same offset will be overwritten, at least in part.
First. Always accept the first value received for each offset in the packet.
Last/RFC791. Always take the last value received for each offset in the packet. Other. Three other possible policies are tested for, but none have yet been observed in practice.
Overlapping and Inconsistent TCP segments. This problem is similar to that of IP fragment reassembly. RFC793 [Po81c] states that an implementation should trim segments "to contain only new data", which implies a "First" policy. The principle for testing is likewise similar to evaluating fragment reassembly ambiguities, and we could do the mapping using any TCP service for which we can conduct an application-level dialog.
Ideally we would use the TCP Echo service, but this is rarely supported; we used SSH and HTTP in testing. We discuss it here as implemented for SSH. Upon connecting, an SSH server sends a version string of the form SSH-<major>.<minor>-<comments>ÒrÒn [Yl02] . The client is expected to send a similar string of its own; if the string is well-formed, the server responds with additional parameters for negotiation. If not well-formed, the server closes the connection, optionally sending an error message.
Our test makes the well-formedness of the version string dependent on the reassembly policy. By sending different combinations of segments, we can deduce the policy from the varied responses. For each of the following two tests, some hosts will reassemble the following legal version string SSH-2.0-blahÒrÒn the success or failure of the connection whether a legal string was reassembled or not. The first test sends the following three segments. Only policies that do not left-trim (or indiscriminately trim) to earlier data will fail.
012346789012
TCP Seq. Offset SH-(First segment) X2.0-blah\r\n (Second segment) S (Third segment)
Note that the initial 'S' is sent last to prevent reassembly until it is sent.
The second sends four segments; this test tries to further discriminate among policies that succeeded on the first test. Policies which never discard already-received data will fail this test.
TCP Seq. Offset
Here there are three observed policies, characterized by the success (connection) of the (first, second) test. They are the same as for IP fragments: BSD (yes, yes), First (yes, no), and Last (no, no). The fourth possibility (no, yes), has not yet been detected in our testing. Observed results by operating system may be found in Section 5.
Difficult or Intractable Cases
The success of Active Mapping depends upon hosts' behaving in a consistent and predictable way. This is generally a good assumption, since most protocol stacks are deterministic and obey relatively simple rules for ambiguity resolution. There are, however, at least three sources of nondeterminism that can make it difficult to perform precise simulation in the NIDS, even with Active Mapping: user-controlled parameters in the TCP stack, new semantics, and non-deterministic packet drops.
Application-level Parameters. Users can change certain parameters that affect the TCP/IP stack. One example, as noted in [HKP01] , is the use of the TCP "urgent" pointer, which marks some part of the sequence space as containing important data that should be processed without delay. Depending on the implementation and user-set parameters, this data may be delivered via a signal or inline to the user process. There is no way for the NIDS to determine unambiguously the reconstructed byte stream as seen by the application without help from the host or hardcoding of the application's interpretation of urgent data.
New semantics. A NIDS must understand the in
Dropping may also be done by routers to meet Quality of Service guarantees. Mechanisms like Diffserv [B+99] that implement QoS but whose exact workings are site-specific are hard to predict, since external and internal traffic may be mingled, each contributing to packet drops for the other. A mitigating factor is that such QoS policies tend to be implemented either at the boundary routers (which filter before the NIDS) or at an external aggregation point.
The NIDS must also know when a host will timeout an IP fragment or TCP segment. Without this knowledge, an attacker can later retransmit the fragment or segment with different data: the NIDS cannot know which was accepted, even with knowledge about which would be accepted if the first did not time out. Though Active Mapping can try to deduce the timeout value, the need for precision in the timeout determination makes this difficult.
Dealing with Timeouts and Packet Drops
The NIDS cannot be notified of every router or end host packet drop. The host being monitored does, however, give some implicit drop information, in the form of acknowledgments and responses to requests or lack thereof. When combined with temporal causality, this can allow partial reconstruction of the host's state.
If we see an acknowledgment of a TCP segment or a response to a UDP or ICMP request, we can infer that the request must have been accepted using only packets that preceded the response. Furthermore, if no response is sent when one is expected, we can infer that packets have been dropped. If the NIDS can send packets in real time, it can send a "keep-alive" TCP packet, one that is out of sequence. This should elicit an ACK that shows the current sequence number.
The NIDS can also watch for ICMP messages indicating timeouts ("Fragment Reassembly Time Exceeded," per [Po81b] ). Not all hosts send these notifications, and they might leak information to an attacker. A compromise might be to configure hosts to generate informative ICMP messages that are filtered by the firewall (but are still seen by the NIDS).
Practical Considerations
There are additional concerns that arise in mapping real networks. Our initial prototype does not handle all these cases and there are likely to be others. We discuss possible approaches to common real-world scenarios below. We point out that Active Mapping does not require a complete profile for each host to be useful: at best, many ambiguities are eliminated; at worst, the default behavior is that of the original NIDS. Thus Active Mapping may be incrementally deployed even while some practical hurdles are being surmounted.
NAT So far our discussion of mapping has assumed that each IP address corresponded to exactly one machine (and a single set of policies). If a NAT [EF94] is running inside the monitored site (so that the NIDS does not see the private addresses), however, we need additional strategies. To handle servers behind a NAT, we could map each port as though it belonged to a separate machine, checking for all relevant policies on each port. It is harder to deal with clients behind a NAT, though this is only relevant in the case of outside servers attacking internal clients in a client OS-specific way.
It can be difficult to detect when a NAT is being used, though recent work by Bellovin [Be02] suggests that it is possible in some cases. If not all NAT IPs are not known to system administrators, the mapper could map multiple ports independently or sample them for differences, which would indicate a NAT's presence.
DHCP
The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) [Dr97] dynamically assigns IP addresses to clients. A DHCP server leases out addresses when clients request them; leases expire periodically. Dealing with DHCP requires some integration: the mapper could be triggered upon seeing DHCP requests (if the broadcast does not make it to the mapping machine, the DHCP server can be set up to notify it). The profile database could include MAC addresses, so the mapper would know when it already has a profile for a given machine (perhaps gathered previously under a different IP address). If integration with a DHCP server is not possible, determining MAC addresses might be nontrivial; it is an area for future work.
TCP Wrappers (Host-Based Access Control) Some hosts use TCP Wrappers to restrict access to services to a set of hosts determined by an Access Control List. If the Active Mapping machine is not granted access, some tests requiring meaningful interaction with a particular TCP service will fail. A simple solution is to allow a designated mapping machine access to relevant services.
Attacks on the Active Mapper
A natural concern is whether or not an attacker could subvert the mapping process, causing false results, by attacking the mapping machine or trying to change mapping traffic. Preventing outsider attacks on the mapper directly is straightforward: simply have the firewall reject all traffic destined for the mapper. There is no legitimate need for direct access to a mapping machine from the outside. A greater concern would be direct attacks from inside machines that have been compromised; the threat could be mitigated by only allowing access to well-known ports from a restricted set of administrative machines at the mapper's local router. Of course, once an attacker has compromised an internal machine many other types of attacks are possible.
Prototype Implementation
We implemented Active Mapping in about 2,000 lines of Perl and have ported it to the Linux and FreeBSD operating systems. It requires a TCP/IP firewall capability, the libpcap packet capture library [MLJ94], and raw socket support. Using these features generally requires superuser access.
ICMP and TCP packets are sent directly using raw sockets. A Pcap filter is set up to capture responses. Our user-level TCP implementation follows a strategy similar to that of Tbit [PF01] , a TCP behavior-inference tool. Like Tbit, we firewall off high-numbered TCP ports for use as ephemeral source ports (to prevent the kernel from responding to incoming traffic to those ports by sending RSTs). Unlike Tbit, which dynamically installs and removes firewall filters, we require the user to allocate and firewall off a range of ports in advance; this reduces the amount of system-dependent code in the mapper at the expense of transparency. Our TCP implementation is rudimentary; currently we perform neither reassembly nor implement congestion control, for example. Nonetheless, it has proved adequate thus far for the short-lived connections needed for mapping, especially since servers tend to send back well-formed replies to our often malformed queries.
The mapper conducts tests in parallel with respect to machines being mapped and with respect to each individual test. The degree of parallelism is determined by the number of available TCP source ports, the size of the packet buffers, and (due in particular to our unoptimized implementation) the CPU speed.
Each test is repeated a configurable number of times (three, in testing) and all the results are recorded. This is important to account for dropped packets and timeouts.
Currently, we have implemented network topology and service discovery as well as the specific tests described in Section 3.2.
We modified the Bro NIDS [Pa98] to use Active Mapping profiles to properly interpret traffic. (We note that this integration may be done with any NIDS which does TCP/IP stream reconstruction, since it will include all the necessary decision points.) The integration was straightforward; a few hundred lines of C++ code were needed. The performance impact of the modifications is discussed in the following section.
Experiments and Results
Observed Active Mapping Profiles
We ran the prototype Active Mapper at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. The exact number of active hosts during our scan is not known, but was estimated based on other scans to be around 6,700. We obtained nontrivial, consistent data (identical results over three trials for something other than the hostname) for just over 4,800 hosts. Many of the IPs for which we did not obtain results are in DHCP blocks (hosts may not always be present); in addition, many users employ host-based firewalls which would prevent our scanning. We are currently working on getting more precise data here (we note that firewalls are likely to prevent the attacks the NIDS is looking for in any case!). It is significant that we obtained results for virtually every machine for which OS data were known; presumably most other machines are more transient or are firewalled enough to stop OS detection. We present Active Mapping profiles by operating system in Figure 4 . Some tests did not yield results due to services' being protected with TCP Wrappers. We expect this limitation can be overcome in practice by adding the mapping machine to the hosts' ACLs as needed.
The amount of observed diversity in policy is remarkable, given that we only ran five tests. While hosts with a given operating system version exhibited the same policies, it is interesting note how policies changed for different versions of the same operating system. Linux in particular seems to have undergone a number of policy changes, even during minor revisions of the kernel. We also note that individual users can alter policies by installing "hardening" or other patches. It is precisely this diversity (borne out by our experiments) that underscores the need to disambiguate traffic destined for each host based its particular observed policy. 6 For 173 hosts, we were unable to get results that were consistent (defined as getting identical results for three trials). This is less surprising, perhaps, in light of the fact that all but 29 of them were found to be printers, routers, or scanners; many of the remaining 29 had unknown operating systems. Furthermore, all but 36 of the 173 hosts gave consistent results for the trials which completed, but had one or more trials which did not complete. This could be due to congestion. In all, only 10 machines which were not known to be special-purpose devices yielded results with conflicting answers.
Stability of Results
We performed another mapping of the hosts at LBNL about 5 months after the original study whose results are presented above. The goal was to see what the "churn rate" was like, i.e., how many IP addresses had come and gone and whether or not profiles had stayed constant. Ideally, one might perform such an analysis a smaller time scales.
First, let us examine the differences between the sets of IP addresses in the two runs. In the original mapping, 4,882 hosts provided nontrivial, consistent results; in the second mapping 4,733 hosts did so. 1,122 IPs were in the first set, but not the second; of these 880 were in DHCP blocks. 973 IPs were in the second set but not the first; 669 were in DHCP blocks. The large fraction in DHCP blocks is important because the set of machines in these blocks may have "IP churn" without "machine churn", which is more significant for us, since it seems feasible to inform the NIDS about DHCP lease updates.
We estimate the "machine churn" in DHCP blocks by comparing the distributions of profiles among the DHCP machines. As we can see from Figure 5 , the distribution is relatively stable; thus we expect that machine churn should be manageable. Among the 1,618 machines with fixed IPs, only 35 showed any difference in AM profile between the two runs. Although we did not have complete OS information for all these IPs for each run, our manual comparison where possible showed that these were almost all due to OS upgrades. Thus, it does not appear that there is a considerable amount of turnover in this group.
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Mapping Time
The times measured are dependent on the policies found: since many tests' results are determined by the presence or absence of a response from the host within a certain time, some policies generate more timeouts than others. Most timeouts are on the order of 5-10 seconds; we found this interval to be sufficient to account for delays at the hosts and in the network.
Mapping a single host requires approximately 37 seconds. This minimum is due to the fact each of the mapping tests is repeated three times, and a single test requires two rounds of communication.
Wall-clock time rises sublinearly through 64 hosts, due to increased parallelism. For more than 64 hosts, though, times are likely to scale linearly since the mapper implements rate-limiting to avoid packet-buffer overflows (a problem we were able to alleviate in part by using larger-than-normal packet capture buffers). Indeed, mapping 101 hosts took 532 seconds, or 5.3 seconds per host; for 64 hosts, the time was 5.7 seconds per host and for 16 hosts, it took 10.1 seconds per host.
Our prototype implementation's inefficiency resulted in user time increases at the rate of somewhat less than two seconds per host being mapped. As a result, parallelism was limited, allowing steady-state rates of about 5 seconds per active host on the full-site mapping with thousands of hosts. We expect that this figure could be improved considerably with a better implementation.
Mapping Traffic
We measured bidirectional network traffic generated during mapping. During a scan of a subnet with 101 live hosts, we recorded statistics (taken over three trials) relating to the number of bytes and packets generated by scanning, both to and from the mapper. The results are in Figure 6 . ICMP packets were due to ICMP service discovery, PMTU and hop count determination, and some IP mappings. TCP packets were due to TCP service discovery, PMTU and hop count determination (if ICMP was not supported), and TCP mappings.
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NIDS Integration Tests
We modified the Bro NIDS by adding support for disambiguation based on Active Mapping profiles; we stress that the choice of NIDS was for convenience since our techniques would apply equally to any TCP/IPanalyzing NIDS. Our goals in testing were twofold: first, to ensure that using Active Mapping would indeed result in correct interpretation of network traffic; second, to check that using Active Mapping would not incur any significant runtime cost. Accordingly, we ran two set of tests: first, a synthetic test with ambiguous traffic; second, a comparison of the original and Active Mappingmodified NIDS on real-world traces. (We expect that results would be substantially the same with any other NIDS integration.)
Synthetic Tests
In order to test the correctness of the modified NIDS (its ability to disambiguate traffic correctly, we generated HTTP attack traffic to 8 hosts with evasion measures added using fragroute [So02] to modified traffic to 2 hosts. Fragroute automatically transformed the request stream to include overlapping and inconsistent IP fragments and TCP segments. The inconsistency favored one of two policies (in our parlance, a "first" policy and a "BSD" policy); the data not expected to be accepted were chosen randomly. For the two machines receiving modified traffic, we used Active Mapping profiles which would allow the traffic to be properly interpreted.
We found that the unmodified NIDS believed the HTTP request to be:
GET /msadcTpo6EGKEY./../..%bTMmzy QaL/system32/fipGNdDg++dir+c:Ò rather than:
GET /msadc/../../../../../../winnt /system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:Ò which was the actual request URL. It is clear that the unmodified NIDS, which had no way to properly resolve the ambiguous overlaps, chose the wrong data to use in reassembly. The modified NIDS performed reassembly correctly.
To measure the impact of Active Mapping on the NIDS' performance in the presence of a relatively high proportion of ambiguous traffic, we used two traces of 500 connections to the 8 hosts. In the first, where none of the connections were modified by fragroute, times were essentially identical over three trials. In the second, where connections to two of the machines were modified by fragroute, the Active Mapping-enabled NIDS was actually about 15% faster, since it was able to discard more data. In practice we expect this effect to be small, since it is only relevant when there are overlapping IP fragments or TCP segments (or the like); such occurrences are uncommon.
Real-world Tests
To get a picture of the performance impact on a larger, more realistic dataset, we used two real-world traces. The first was of a wide variety of non-HTTP traffic (mostly just SYN/FIN/RST packets, the data filtered out) gathered by a one-hour capture at a busy site (100.2 MB data, 1.2 M packets, 273 K connections). The second was of two hours of HTTP traffic (with full data) at another site (137 MB, 197 K packets, 6,379 connections). In both cases, the results were the same: with Active Mapping on, execution time was essentially identical 7 . Memory usage was approximately 200K higher with AM (specific profiles were used for about 4,800 hosts; a default one for the rest), a small fraction of the 68MB used overall.
We are currently working on deploying an Active Mapping-enabled NIDS operationally to get more data on the impact of using AM profiles on performance and precision.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The test results suggest that mapping can be performed quite frequently. A full class C subnet can be scanned in about 20 minutes, so daily scans during off-peak times are certainly feasible. Importantly, with a steady-state rate of about 5 seconds per host (using our unoptimized prototype), it is feasible to completely remap even large sites-say, thousands of hosts-on a weekly basis during off-peak hours. Certain tests whose results we expect not to change often (e.g., those related to network topology) can be performed less frequently. The mapping-induced traffic of about 19 KB per host mapped is quite low and its impact during off-peak hours is likely to be negligible.
Remapping can also be triggered by any inconsistency between the stored policy and an observed one. For example, if a host sends an ICMP Needs Fragmentation message for a packet smaller than the stored PMTU, then the host should be remapped. External information, e.g., OS fingerprint results, can be used to detect changes in the status of a machine as well.
On-the-fly mapping-mapping when the first packet to a host is seen-is probably not possible, because many tests take several seconds. In any case, host policy changes are most likely to be triggered by infrequent operating system upgrades. More frequent changes to the policy database are those initiated by DHCP. As we have noted, we can store policies by MAC address and simply update a table when the NIDS sees a DHCP request (or is informed of a new lease by the DHCP server itself). For new hosts-say, a laptop attached for the first time to the network-mapping can be performed in under one minute (mapping a single host takes on the order of 30 seconds). This period of uncertainty is unlikely to be problematic, since it is rare that DHCP clients export public services.
Runtime performance in the NIDS was not negatively affected by the addition of Active Mapping-based disambiguation. In fact, since using Active Mapping results allows the NIDS to discard additional packets, performance in some cases was actually improved. The ad-ditional memory footprint was approximately 100 bytes per host. We expect with all mappings implemented it would be on the order of a few hundred bytes.
The modified NIDS was also capable of correctly interpreting traffic in a way that the original one was not, detecting precise attacks that the original could only hint at through warnings about inconsistent retransmission. We stress that no amount of care in the design of the original could have changed its behavior in this respect: since hosts' behavior varies, any single policy employed by the NIDS will inevitably fail for hosts that employ a different one.
6 Related Work
Normalization
As previously discussed, traffic normalization seeks to eliminate network traffic ambiguities by altering the traffic stream [HKP01] . The normalizer lies in the forwarding path of packets into a site. It reassembles IP fragments and TCP streams and statefully modifies or filters out nonconforming traffic before sending packets on to the internal network. Its efficacy in improving the precision of the NIDS relies on its output being interpreted in the same way by all the hosts on the network. It largely succeeds at achieving this goal; the paper also discusses some exceptions.
There are disadvantages to normalization, however. A normalizer performs the same sorts of tasks as a firewall, but is doing more work: it deals with TCP streams rather than just individual packets. Two main concerns arising from this complexity are performance and robustness. Since the normalizer is in the forwarding path, it must be able to process every packet as it arrives, even in the presence of stateholding attacks on itself. Further, it must be extremely reliable; if it is not, the entire site may lose Internet connectivity. An additional concern is that the normalizer changes the semantics of the streams it rewrites. This can block useful traffic, cause unintended problems with newer protocols, or decrease efficiency.
It appears that Active Mapping can replace many of the normalizations (see the Appendix for a full list). Still, there are cases in which some amount of normalization can confer significant benefits: its ability to remove flags and options can be used to eliminate any uncertainty as to their use.
Accordingly, it may sometimes work best to use informed partial normalization, that is, to perform a limited set of normalizations that eliminate ambiguities that Active Mapping cannot. If the host profiles indicate that certain kinds of noncompliant packets are never accepted by any host, or if administrators want an additional layer of safety, such packets may be filtered out at the firewall.
Mapping Tools
Active Mapping's tactic of sending specially crafted packets and interpreting responses to infer host properties has been employed in a variety of tools.
The most common purpose for such tools is to determine the operating system of a host. Nmap [Fyo01] uses port scans combined with IP and TCP options in responses to guess a host's operating system. Queso [Sa98] takes a similar tack, sending TCP packets with illegal flag combinations. By matching initial TTL values, advertised TCP windows, initial sequence numbers, nonconforming responses to packets sent to closed ports, and so forth, these tools can detect a large number of operating system versions.
Neither provides us with enough precise information on the long list of policy choices and parameters we need. Since doing OS detection takes approximately as long as Active Mapping, there seems little advantage to doing OS detection instead for this purpose; however, knowing the host OS can be very useful in eliminating false positives (i.e., could a particular attack actually succeed?). We note that, especially in light of the fact that operating systems may be user-modified, the actually observed behavior is the only relevant thing for correct interpretation: the OS version is at best a proxy for this information.
Nonetheless, there is a certain synergy between the two. If OS data is known, it can serve as a quick proxy for mapping characteristics when coupled to a database containing canonical mappings by OS type and version. Conversely, known mappings can give at least a rough estimation of the OS a host is running. This can be useful for alert filtering: if a particular attack only works on Linux and the mapping data suggest a Windows machine, then we can filter out irrelevant alerts without knowing more precisely the OS versions.
The Ntop NIDS has been supplemented with network information inferred from passive monitoring [DS00] ; this information appears to be limited to guessing the hop count and figuring out which IP addresses correspond to routers.
Tbit [PF01] tries to learn the TCP behavior of HTTP servers in regards to congestion control. It only sends legitimate TCP packets, relying on TCP options, advertised windows, and timing information to deduce the server's TCP configuration (or bugs therein). We use its scheme for implementing our user-level TCP.
Summary
Ambiguity in the interpretation of network traffic is a critical difficulty for Network Intrusion Detection. This ambiguity takes many forms. Some types may be resolved by careful construction of the NIDS. Other types are fundamentally more difficult to resolve, and require additional information about the network and the hosts being monitored. In this paper, we have presented Active Mapping, a method of eliminating network-and transport-layer ambiguities by informing the NIDS of relevant network and host TCP/IP stack policies. We stress that the ambiguities that Active Mapping seeks to address are readily exploitable; systems have been designed for doing just that [So02, Mc98] .
Active Mapping runs separately from the NIDS (typically during off-peak hours) and works by sending specially crafted packets to each host and inferring policy from the responses it receives (or lack thereof). It does not require any real-time manipulation of the incoming traffic stream by the NIDS. In our tests with a NIDS modified to use Active Mapping-generated profiles, we found that there was essentially no cost in terms of speed or memory use to get the increased precision in analysis; we expect this will hold true for any NIDS. In addition, we have shown that Active Mapping itself is efficient in terms of time, network bandwidth consumed, and output size. Preliminary mapping results show considerable variation in policy among hosts' TCP/IP stacks, underscoring the need for the precise simulation that Active Mapping enables. Future work in this area might include exploring using passive monitoring to determine when to remap a host, as well as an implementation of mapping of DHCP clients and implementation of more of the mappings described in the Appendix.
Finally, we note that the problem of ambiguous traffic is not confined to the network and transport layers. It also occurs at the application layer-for example, exactly how will a particular URL be interpreted?-and dealing with all possible ambiguities appears essentially intractable. Active Mapping profiles might be able to help lower false positives by allowing the NIDS to consider only platform-relevant attacks, but analysis of this potential benefit is beyond the scope of this paper. Thus we do not claim to have "solved" the NIDS evasion problem. However, we believe that the general problem of ambiguity resolution is best addressed in a systematic, layered fashion, and Active Mapping represents a step toward eliminating ambiguity at the bottom layers.
